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Abstract—We consider covert communication using a queuing
timing channel in the presence of a warden. The covert message
is encoded using the inter-arrival times of the packets, and the
legitimate receiver and the warden observe the inter-departure
times of the packets from their respective queues. The transmitter
and the legitimate receiver also share a secret key to facilitate
covert communication. We propose achievable schemes that obtain
non-zero covert rate for both exponential and general queues when
a sufficiently high rate secret key is available. This is in contrast
to other channel models such as the Gaussian channel or the
discrete memoryless channel where only O(√n) covert bits can
be sent over n channel uses, yielding a zero covert rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a covert communication system, where Alice
wishes to send a message W covertly to Bob using a timing
channel in the presence of a warden Willie, as depicted in
Fig. 1. To facilitate such covert information transfer, we allow
Alice and Bob to have a shared secret key K. The channels to
Bob and Willie are error-free bit pipes leading to buffers that
are modeled as single-server queues with service rates of µ1
packets per second and µ2 packets per second, respectively. The
packets arrive at both Bob’s and Willie’s queue simultaneously,
and do not contain any covert information. When Alice does
not have any covert messages to send, the arrival of the packets
at the queues is modeled as a Poisson process with rate λ. In
order to send the covert message W , Alice encodes W in the
inter-arrival times of the packets at the queues. The warden
Willie is a passive observer and tries to detect the presence of
a covert message based on any unusual patterns in the timings
of the packets observed by him. The goal of this paper is the
study strategies for reliable and covert information transmission
from Alice to Bob in the presence of Willie.
To that end, we first1 assume that both queues have exponen-
tial service times; i.e., the service times of Bob’s and Willie’s
queues are exponentially distributed with means 1µ1 and
1
µ2
,
respectively. We exploit a result in [1], which characterizes
the maximum rate of reliable information transmission, or the
capacity, using the timing channel with an exponential service
time queue. This gives us an upper bound on the capacity
of the covert information transmission rate. Next, to ensure
covertness, we want that the probability distribution of the
departure times of the packets at Willie’s queue remains almost
the same, irrespective of whether a covert message is being
sent or not. Thus, the distribution of the departure times at
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1Later, in Theorem 2, we consider queues with general service distributions.
Willie’s queue, induced by the designed codebook and the
uniform choice of the covert message, closely approximates
the distribution of the departure times when the packet arrivals
are modeled as a Poisson process with rate λ. This brings us
to the setting of channel resolvability [2], where we want to
approximate the output distribution induced by a process with
the output distribution induced by a codebook. The results of
[1] and [2] together yield the proposed achievable schemes.
An interesting aspect of the result is the fact that a strictly
positive rate is achievable in this case. This is in contrast to
other covert channels studied in the literature, such as the covert
Gaussian channel [3] and the covert discrete memoryless chan-
nel [4], [5], where only2 O(√n) bits can be sent in n channel
uses, i.e., the covert rate is zero. For each of these channels,
there is an innocent symbol which is transmitted in the absence
of a covert message. In the Gaussian channel, for example, the
default input symbol is zero when no communication is taking
place. Analogously, for the discrete memoryless channel, it is a
symbol x0. In order to send information, one has to use at least
one non-innocent symbol x1; however, if too many3 (more than
ω(
√
n)) of the non-innocent symbol x1 are sent in n channel
uses, the induced output distribution differs significantly from
the default output distribution induced by the input of the
innocent symbol only. In the Gaussian channel, for example,
using too many non-zero symbols with non-vanishing power
significantly increases the output power, and the warden can
detect the communication.
On the queuing timing channel, packets naturally arrive at
the queue with i.i.d. exponential inter-arrival times when there
is no communication using the timing channel. That is, the
innocent state is a sequence of packets with i.i.d. exponential
inter-arrival times. On the other hand, when communication
is taking place on the covert channel, the inter-arrival times
belong to a codeword drawn from a codebook. Thus, in order
to detect whether communication is taking place, the warden
tries to determine if the input to the timing channel, i.e.,
the inter-arrival times, belong to an i.i.d. exponential process,
or to a codeword drawn from a fixed codebook, using its
output observations. Thus, to ensure covertness, we only need
to ensure stealth [6], which requires the output distribution
induced by the codebook to approximate the default output
distribution induced by an i.i.d. input process closely. Note
that stealth does not imply covertness in Gaussian or discrete
2f(n) = O(g(n))⇔ ∃M,n0 s.t. f(n) ≤Mg(n), ∀n ≥ n0.
3f(n) = ω(g(n))⇔ ∀m > 0,∃n0 > 0 s.t. f(n) > mg(n), ∀n ≥ n0.
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memoryless channels, since the warden can detect the transmis-
sion even if it cannot distinguish whether the received symbols
belong to some codebook, or are outputs corresponding to
i.i.d. inputs by observing the output distribution. In the timing
channel, however, stealth implies covertness, and as in discrete
memoryless channels, the stealth constraint can be met with a
strictly positive rate [6]. Hence, we achieve covertness on the
timing channel with a non-zero rate.
Related Work: Timing channels have been widely inves-
tigated in the context of both communication and computer
systems. In most cases, the timing channel is not the primary
intended means of information transfer, and timing is not
usually considered a data object. Thus, timing channels, by
themselves, are considered covert in most of the literature.
From a communication perspective, references [7], [8] pro-
vide achievable schemes for certain timing channel models
and analyzes their performance using an information theoretic
framework. Reference [1] analyzes the limits of reliable in-
formation transmission using the timings of packet arrivals
and departures, i.e., the capacity of the timing channel for a
single-server queue. In contrast to usual discrete memoryless
channels, the timing channel model used in [1] has memory and
is not stationary. Therefore, reference [1] employs information
spectrum methods [9] in order to analyze its capacity. The exact
capacity is derived for queues with exponentially distributed
service times, and upper and lower bounds are provided for
general queues. While reference [1] deals with continuous
time arrivals, reference [10] analyzes discrete time queues and
shows that the geometric service time distribution plays a
role analogous to the exponential distribution for continuous
time queues. Extensions to secure transmission of information
using the timing channel are also available in the literature
[11]. References [12]–[14] study practical code designs that
approach the capacity of the timing channel.
In the context of computer systems, a timing channel analysis
can often represent a side channel attack from a malicious
adversary. For example, in shared event schedulers, a mali-
cious user process can infer information about the legitimate
user process’ arrival patterns, and compromise the privacy or
security of the legitimate user. References [15], [16] quantify
the information leakage in the context of such shared event
schedulers. Mitigation of such timing channel attacks has also
been studied in the literature, e.g., in references [17]–[19].
Reference [20] studies the problem of information leakage
through the timing channel in the framework of a game between
the covert transmitter-receiver pair and a jammer who tries
to disrupt the covert communication while being subject to
buffer or delay constraints. Other mitigation techniques such
as predictive mitigation [21] and time-deterministic replay [22]
have also been explored in the literature.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider covert communication through two parallel
single-server queues as shown in Fig. 1. The information in the
packets is intended for both Bob and Willie. Alice also wants to
send a covert message W to Bob without allowing the warden
(A1, . . . , An)
(D1, . . . , Dn)
(E1, . . . , En)
µ1
µ2
Alice
Bob
Willie
W
Wˆ
H0:W = φ
H1:W 6= φ
Fig. 1: Covert communication over timing channels.
Willie to detect it. The covert message is encoded in the arrival
times of the packets entering both Bob’s queue and Willie’s
queue simultaneously. In the absence of a covert message, the
packet arrivals are modeled as a Poisson process with rate λ,
i.e., the inter-arrival times of the packets are exponential with
mean 1λ . Bob’s queue has a service rate of µ1 packets/s, while
Willie’s queue has a service rate of µ2 packets/s. We assume
λ ≤ min(µ1, µ2) to ensure stability of both queues.
In order to send the covert message W , Alice encodes it
in the inter-arrival times of the packets at the queues, i.e.,
the covert message is encoded as a vector of n non-negative
inter-arrival times A = (A1, . . . , An), such that the kth packet
enters both queues at time
∑k
i=1Ai. The intended receiver Bob
and the warden Willie both observe the sequence of departure
times of the packets at their respective queues. Therefore, the
output of each channel is a vector of n non-negative inter-
departure times, which we denote by D = (D1, . . . Dn) and
E = (E1, . . . , En) for Bob’s and Willie’s channels, respec-
tively. The departure times of the kth packet from Bob’s and
Willie’s queues are
∑k
i=1Di and
∑k
i=1Ei, respectively.
The service times for the kth packet in Bob’s and Willie’s
queues are denoted by Sk and Tk, respectively. Sk and Tk
are mutually independent of each other and of A, Dk−1 and
Ek−1. The idling time for the kth packet is the time elapsed
between the (k − 1)th departure and the kth arrival; if the kth
arrival occurs before the (k− 1)th departure, the idling time is
zero. Denoting the idling time for the kth packet in Bob’s and
Willie’s queues by Uk and Vk, respectively, we have,
Uk =max
(
0,
k∑
i=1
Ai −
k−1∑
i=1
Di
)
(1)
Vk =max
(
0,
k∑
i=1
Ai −
k−1∑
i=1
Ei
)
(2)
which are deterministic functions of (Ak, Dk−1) and
(Ak, Ek−1), respectively. Also the inter-departure times can
now be expressed as
Dk =Uk + Sk (3)
Ek =Vk + Tk (4)
We have the following Markov chains:
Dk → Uk → (Ak, Dk−1) (5)
Ek → Vk → (Ak, Ek−1) (6)
Note that this model of the single-server queue has memory, a
non-linear input-output relation and is non-stationary.
The objective in the covert communication setting is to
RRK
λ log µ1λ
λ log µ2µ1
Fig. 2: Achievable (R,RK) region when µ2 > µ1.
ensure that the warden Willie cannot detect the presence of
a covert message with its observations of the departure times,
while also allowing the intended receiver Bob to decode the
covert message with probability of error approaching zero. To
facilitate this, we also allow Alice and Bob to share a secret
key K which is not available to Willie. Formally, we have the
following definition.
Definition 1 An (n,Mn, Ln, Tn, n, δn) secret key assisted
covert timing code consists of the following:
• a message set Wn = {1, . . . ,Mn} at Alice, from which a
covert message W is picked uniformly,
• a key set Kn = {1, . . . , Ln} available at Alice and Bob,
from which a secret key K is picked uniformly,
• an encoding function (possibly stochastic) at Alice φn :
Wn×Kn → A that maps the message and the secret key
into a codeword, which is a vector of n non-negative inter-
arrival times such that the kth arrival occurs at
∑k
i=1Ak,
• a decoding function at Bob ψn : D × Kn → Wn that
maps the observed codeword of inter-departure times D
and the secret key K to the decoded message Wˆ , such
that the probability of error
P(W 6= Wˆ ) ≤ n (7)
• satisfies the covertness constraint at Willie,
d(PE, Q
n
0 ) ≤ δn (8)
where d(P,Q) denotes the variational distance ||P−Q||1,
PE denotes the distribution of E in the presence of covert
message, Q0 is the default distribution of inter-departure
times when no covert message is present; in our case, if
the arrival process has rate λ < min(µ1, µ2), Q0 will
also be a Poisson process with rate λ,
• the nth departure from Bob’s queue occurs, on average,
no later than Tn.
A covert rate R is achievable with secret key rate RK , if
R
RK
λ log µ1λ
Fig. 3: Achievable (R,RK) region when µ2 < µ1.
there exists a (n,Mn, Ln, Tn, n, δn) covert timing code with
lim inf
n→∞
logMn
Tn
≥R (9)
lim sup
n→∞
logLn
n
≤RK (10)
lim sup
n→∞
n =0 (11)
lim sup
n→∞
δn =0 (12)
A covert rate R is said to be achievable with secret key
rate RK at output rate λ, if R is achievable using a sequence
of (n,Mn, Ln, nλ, n, δn) covert timing codes. The covert
capacity at output rate λ, denoted by C(λ) is the supremum
of all rates R that are achievable with output rate λ.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of this paper are the following two theo-
rems.
Theorem 1 Assume both queues are M/M/1. Then, covert
communication is possible with output rate λ < min(µ1, µ2)
if (R,RK) lies in the following region:
R ≥0 (13)
R <λ log
µ1
λ
(14)
RK >max
(
0, λ log
µ2
µ1
)
(15)
Fig. 2 shows the (R,RK) region when µ2 > µ1, while Fig. 3
shows the (R,RK) region when µ2 < µ1. Note that when
µ2 < µ1, i.e., when the service rate of the Willie’s queue is
less than the service rate of Bob’s queue, no positive rate secret
key is required to achieve the maximum covert rate. Intuitively,
Willie has a worse timing channel in this case than Bob. On
the other hand, when µ2 > µ1, a secret key of sufficient rate
is required for covertness, as shown in Fig. 2.
Further, note that even when µ2 > µ1, given a sufficient
rate of secret key to enable covert communication, Alice can
communicate with Bob with the full capacity at output rate λ. In
other words, there is no loss of rate due to the extra covertness
constraints, as long as a secret key of sufficient rate is available
to Alice and Bob. Intuitively, a secret key of sufficient length
increases the size of the input codebook such that the output
distribution induced by this codebook is close to that induced
by an i.i.d. input, thus, ensuring covertness. If a key of sufficient
rate is not available, our achievable scheme cannot guarantee
covertness. Thus, the minimum rate RminK of the secret key,
if required, can be considered the price of covertness, and is
given by
RminK = max
(
0, λ log
µ2
µ1
)
(16)
Also note the contrast of this result with the corresponding
result for Gaussian channels [3] or discrete memoryless chan-
nels [4]. In both these cases, no covert communication with
positive rate is possible in general. The best achievable rate in
n channel uses is O(ωn
√
n) in each case, where
lim
n→∞ωn =0 (17)
lim
n→∞nωn =∞ (18)
In each case, there is an innocent symbol, the zero symbol
for the Gaussian channel or some symbol x0 for the discrete
memoryless channel, which is transmitted in the absence of a
covert message, and a corresponding default output distribution.
Hence, the default distribution at the input is the degenerate
distribution with all the probability mass at the all-zero (or,
the all x0) codeword. This degenerate distribution, by itself,
cannot be used to transmit any information. In order to transmit
information, at least one non-innocent symbol x1 must be
used. Using too many (more than ω(
√
n)) such non-innocent
symbols in n channel uses, however, results in the induced
output distribution to differ significantly from the default output
distribution, and covertness is lost. In our case, however, we
exploit the fact that packets naturally arrive at the queue even in
the absence of a covert message, i.e., in our case, the default, or
innocent, setting is a sequence of packets with i.i.d. exponential
inter-arrival times. Thus, we ensure stealth [6] in the timing
channel. As in the discrete memoryless channel with a stealth
constraint [6], we achieve a non-zero rate in the timing channel.
Unlike discrete memoryless channels, however, stealth implies
covertness in the timing channel.
While the result in Theorem 1 holds for timing channels with
exponential service times, similar achievability results can be
obtained for general service distributions as well. We have the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 Assume that the queues are M/G/1, such that
Bob’s queue has a service distribution PB and Willie’s queue
has a service distribution PW . Then, covert communication is
possible with output rate λ < min(µ1, µ2) when (R,RK) lies
in the following region:
R ≥0 (19)
R <λ log
µ1
λ
(20)
R+RK >max
(
0, λ log
µ2
µ1
+ λD(PW ||eµ2)
)
(21)
where eµ2 denotes the exponential distribution with mean
1
µ2
.
Note that the rates in the theorem above are sufficient
conditions to ensure covert communications; they are not
necessary. As in the case of the exponential queue, no secret
key is required if µ1 is sufficiently larger than µ2: when
log µ1µ2 > D(PW ||eµ2).
IV. PROOFS OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2
A. Proof of Theorem 1
An achievable scheme for covert communication is as fol-
lows:
Encoding: First, fix any (R,RK) in the achievable region
stated in Theorem 1. Introduce a dummy message W˜ ∈ W˜ ={
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, where R0 is chosen such that
R+R0 ≤λ log µ1
λ
(22)
R+R0 +RK ≥λ log µ2
λ
(23)
Note that this is possible as long as (R,RK) lies in the region
specified in Theorem 1. Bob will try to decode (W, W˜ ). Then:
• The transmitter generates a random codebook with
2n(R+R0+RK) n-length codewords, with each code sym-
bol being drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from an exponential
distribution with mean 1λ . The codewords are indexed as
a(w, w˜, k), w ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR}, w˜ ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR0} and
k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRK}.
• To send a message w ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR}, when the re-
alization of the secret key is k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRK}, the
transmitter chooses w˜ uniformly from
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
, and
sends a(w, w˜, k), i.e., the inter-arrival time of the kth
packet is the kth code symbol ak(w, w˜, k).
Decodability: Bob tries to decode (w, w˜). Since the secret key
is available at Bob, decoding with vanishing probability of error
is possible as long as
R+R0 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
iA;D(A;D) (24)
where
iX;Y (X;Y ) =
pXY (X,Y )
pX(X)pY (Y )
(25)
is the mutual information density random variable, and
p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
iXn;Y n(X
n;Y n)
= sup
{
r : lim
n→∞P
[
1
n
iXn;Y n(X
n;Y n) < r
]
= 0
}
(26)
It is shown in [1] that in our case when λ < µ1
p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
iA;D(A;D) = λ log
µ1
λ
(27)
Therefore, the decodability constraint is satisfied.
Covertness: We note that the secret key is not available at
Willie. However, we want to approximate the i.i.d. random
Poisson process with rate λ by the output induced by our
codebook in order to ensure covertness. From the result of [2],
this is possible if
R+R0 +RK ≥ p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
iA;E(A;E) (28)
Again, it is shown in [1] that in our case when λ < µ2
p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
iA;E(A;E) = λ log
µ2
λ
(29)
Therefore, the covertness constraint is also satisfied. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The achievable scheme for the general queue is similar to
the scheme for the exponential queue. The encoding involves
a random codebook with 2n(R+R0+RK) n-length codewords,
with each code symbol being drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from
the exponential distribution with mean 1λ . To send a message
w ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR}, when the realization of the secret key is
k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nRK}, the transmitter chooses a dummy message
w˜ uniformly from
{
1, . . . , 2nR0
}
and sends a(w, w˜, k), i.e.,
the inter-arrival time of the kth packet is the kth code symbol
ak(w, w˜, k).
Decodability: As in the M/M/1 case, since the secret key is
available at Bob, decoding (w, w˜) with vanishing probability
of error is possible as long as
R+R0 ≤ p- lim inf
n→∞
1
n
iA;D(A;D) (30)
It is known from [1] that capacity of the timing channel
with exponential service time is the least among all service
distributions. Hence, decoding is guaranteed when
R+R0 ≤ λ log µ1
λ
(31)
Covertness: As in the M/M/1 case, covert communication is
possible as long as
R+R0 +RK ≥ p- lim sup
n→∞
1
n
iA;E(A;E) (32)
Again from [1], it is known that for the M/G/1 channel,
the capacity of the timing channel is bounded by λ log µ2λ +
λD(PW ||eµ2). Therefore, covertness is guaranteed as long as
R+R0 +RK ≥ λ log µ2
λ
+ λD(PW ||eµ2) (33)
Eliminating R0 from the decodability condition in (31) and
the covertness condition in (33) yields the rate constraints in
Theorem 2. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced the notion of covert communication using
a queuing timing channel in the presence of a warden. The
covert message is encoded using the inter-arrival times of the
packets and the legitimate receiver and the warden observe
the inter-departure times of the packets from their respective
queues. The transmitter and the legitimate receiver also share
a secret key to facilitate covert communication. We proposed
achievable schemes that obtain a non-zero covert rate for both
M/M/1 and M/G/1 queues. This is in contrast to other
channel models such as the Gaussian channel or the discrete
memoryless channel where only O(√n) covert bits can be sent
over n channel uses, and therefore, the achievable covert rate
is zero. We exploit the fact that stealth implies covertness in
the timing channel.
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